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1 Though the name “AF,” and the title What the Anti-Federalists Were For, lends to the obvious 
interpretation that the work’s primary concern is to articulate the Anti-Federalist political 
ideology, Story’s work also offers some incredible insights into the Federalists’ theoretical 
views. Thus, please note that even if a quote or footnote is attributed to “AF,” there is a chance 
that it is being used to substantiate either a Federalist or Anti-Federalist position.   
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Preface	  	  
 
The first brush stroke on the canvas of one of the most polarizing political controversies 
in recent memory was applied on June 5, 2013, under the guise of a newspaper article printed by 
Britain’s Guardian. Using text from a previously classified governmental order from the 
relatively unknown Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), the article alluded to the 
existence of intelligence programs that secretly condoned the warrantless collection of American 
citizen’s phone records. ⁠ Despite touching on the inherent legality of the order under the 
“business records” provision of the Patriot Act,2 the article insinuated that the disclosure was 
merely the beginning of a charge to reopen “debates in the US over the proper extent of the 
government’s domestic spying powers.”3 
Without missing a beat, the Guardian followed up the story the next day with yet another 
leaked document that extended the allegations of the National Security Agencies’ (NSA) spying 
to encompass internet providers like Apple, Facebook, and Google.4 After only a few days of 
coverage, the Guardian’s stories evoked an international media frenzy that left Americans 
questioning how a government agency could possibly justify such gross infringements against 
the civil liberties of its own citizens. In an exclusive interview with the Guardian on June 9, 
whistleblower Edward Snowden articulated that his ultimate motivation was to provide the 
public with access to the information he had encountered through his dealings as an NSA 
                                                
2 The Patriot Act. 50 USC § 1861. 
3 Glenn Greenwald, “NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily.” 
The Guardian, June 5, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-
verizon-court-order. 
4 Glenn Greenwald, and Ewen MacAskill, “NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, 
Google and Others,” June 6, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-
giants-nsa-data. 
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contractor, as a means to ensure that everyone could adequately understand and assess these 
governmental programs. 
Upon first learning about Edward Snowden's actions, I couldn't help but laud what the 
young security analyst was attempting to accomplish. In what seemed like the quintessential 
David and Goliath parable, Snowden challenged one of the world's preeminent powers, and 
bolstered his credibility by substantiating his worrisome claims with a horde of classified 
government documents. Prior to the leaks I had a very rudimentary understanding of the NSA, 
inevitably leaving my own opinions unguarded from the bias associated with the media's one-
sided reporting approach. This incomplete understanding marred my perception, and led me to 
view Snowden as a rebellious American hero, who — much like the men who drafted the 
Declaration of Independence — risked his life and honor to ensure that the American people 
could be acutely aware of the US government's surveillance activities.  
As a consequence of my early views, I originally intended to advance a theoretical 
argument that supported the merits of Snowden's actions. Though I full-heartedly believed in my 
preliminary position, I started seeing the situation from a different lens as I began to pore over 
the works of John Locke and the other political theorists whose ideas inspired our Constitution. 
Whereas my initial postulations mirrored the momentary shock of the profound leaks, the more I 
began to understand our government in terms of its underlying necessity, the more I began to 
understand the NSA's programs and their specific purposes. As I continued to interact with the 
theoretical underpinnings of the Constitution, I refined my inquiry and reversed my original 
sentiments towards the NSA's programs. In this spirit, by mirroring this argument to my own 
personal experience, my ultimate aim is to provide a logical and thought provoking defense of 
the NSA's actions as a necessary consequence of the current national security landscape. 
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Introduction	   
Suspicion is a virtue as long as its object is the public good, and as long as it stays within proper 
bounds…Guard with jealous attention the public liberty. Suspect every one who approaches that 
jewel. 
            Patrick Henry 
 
 
It seems difficult to deny that Edward Snowden's leaks have profoundly shaped the 
world's perception of the NSA. In the course of providing international media outlets with access 
to more than a million and a half classified government documents that verified the existence of 
intelligence programs that secretly collected American citizen's private data, Snowden has 
ultimately succeeded in igniting numerous debates in Congress, amongst the public, and between 
the US government and its allies.5 Altogether, these leaks allege that the NSA's data collection 
programs are incompatible with the privacy rights that underlie the US Constitution, charging 
that the agency’s domestic collection methods violate particular Fourth Amendment rights 
through precedent stemming from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). 
Though it now appears almost inevitable that the leaks will result in significant legislative 
changes focused on increasing the NSA's transparency, this paper will argue that Snowden's 
allegations are ultimately inconsequential because they reflect a shortsighted over-adherence to 
the protection of individual liberties that is eerily reminiscent of the Anti-Federalist ideology that 
was invalidated with the ratification of our current Constitution.  
Before Snowden's revelations surfaced, the clandestine nature of the NSA's operations 
cloaked the agency under a veil of secrecy that left the public largely unaware of its role in our 
government's operations. Though this collective ignorance was imperative for the NSA to 
                                                
5 John Miller, "NSA Speaks Out on Snowden Spying." 60 Minutes, December 15, 2013. 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nsa-speaks-out-on-snowden-spying/. 
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adequately achieve its articulated goals of collecting foreign intelligence, Snowden's charges 
allowed the entire nation to scrutinize the agency’s activities without properly contextualizing 
the necessity behind the programs in question. This incomplete portrayal inevitably roused the 
public's fear that the US government was overstepping its constitutionally prescribed bounds, 
consequently imbuing a false sense of worry across the nation.  
Though the basic tenants of both law and government are considered common knowledge 
in the United States, their mutual presence in our daily lives has drastically morphed how we 
perceive their existence. Given this reality, instead of basing our judgments on "the spirit of the 
laws," we tend to take the "indispensable necessity" behind their existence for granted, and focus 
our attention solely on their perceived side effects.6 In particular, while the cursory view depicted 
by the present situation illuminates the problems associated with the government's ability to 
provide for the nation's general welfare at the expense of encroaching on certain individual 
rights, the public’s ardent focus on the effects of the NSA's programs has fallaciously led us to 
forget why they actually exist in the first place.7 
 Through this heightened discourse between the dichotomous notions of freedom and 
safety, Snowden's allegations shed light on a philosophical question that was heavily debated by 
the Federalists and Anti-Federalists during the 1787 Constitutional Convention: namely, is a 
strong central government conducive to protecting individual liberty? Though the Federalists' 
                                                
6 Matthew Bergman, "Montesquieu's Theory of Government and the Framing of the American 
Constitution." Pepperdine Law Review 18, no. 1 (1990): 2. 
7 In an extremely unscientific survey, I asked upwards of 20 University of Michigan Political 
Science students about their opinions on both Snowden and the NSA’s breach of the Fourth 
Amendment. Of the people questioned, not a single person brought up the contextualized 
understanding of the Bill of Rights as an Anti-Federalist concession or the inherently complex 
understanding associated with the Constitution’s “Necessary and Proper Clause.” As such, I 
decided that the only way people would actually be able to make an objective valuation would be 
if they were supplied with all the requisite historical and theoretical considerations that make this 
issue so interesting.  
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view of an energetic federal government ultimately prevailed, the positive public reception to 
Snowden implies that the centerpiece of the Anti-Federalist position still subsists in the United 
States. By opposing the NSA's programs on the grounds that they violate distinct Fourth 
Amendment rights, Snowden’s supporters are unknowingly endorsing a passive view of 
government that reflects the same fears of centralized power that were embodied in the Anti-
Federalists' preference for the Articles of Confederation. With this distinction in mind, instead of 
analyzing the current legal framework to adjudicate whether the NSA's programs are in line with 
the Constitution, this argument will position Snowden as "the Contemporary Anti-Federalist" by 
tracing the ideological progression of American political thought.  
If we operate under the premise that political associations are expressed "in different 
forms"8 and these forms vary depending on the people, circumstance, and history of a given 
place, it seems practical to begin by following S.E. Morison's view that the derivation of "these 
[political] ideas" in America,  
Can be traced back to the mother country. In England these ideas [of politics] persisted 
through the centuries despite a certain twisting and thwarting at the hands of the Tudor 
monarchs and Whig aristocrats; In America they found opportunity for free 
development…It was an unconscious mission of the Untied States to make explicit what 
had long been implicit in the British Constitution, and to prove the value of principles 
that had largely been forgotten in the England of George III.9 
 
Thus, while the United States as a nation was officially born in July of 1776, it is virtually 
impossible to asses our own laws without examining their pre-colonial roots in England. Heeding 
this understanding, the first chapter following this introduction will trace the evolution of British 
political thought from the Norman invasion in 1066, to the Glorious Revolution in 1688. By 
                                                
8 Aristotle, "Politics." In Classic of Political & Moral Philosophy. Second ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 213. 
9 Ernst Cassier, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992). 
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pairing this historical portrayal with overviews of the political philosophies of John Locke, and 
John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon's Cato, this section will provide the theoretical background 
for the American conception of government. 
 After thoroughly differentiating the British understanding of political power from the 
theoretical views of human nature and individual liberty that provided the infrastructure for our 
Founding Fathers' understanding of government, the second chapter will use the arguments 
articulated in our own founding documents to show how these theoretical views were 
encapsulated within the post-revolutionary American Constitution. In addition, the section will 
highlight the differences between the Anti-Federalist and Federalist political philosophies, as a 
primary means to articulate the rationale behind the necessity of the government's undefined 
powers to counteract the unknown nature of the means necessary to complete its charge.  
 With this refined constitutional understanding in place, the third and concluding chapter 
will return to the present situation to re-assess Snowden's accusations against the differences 
between the Federalist and Anti-Federalist positions.  
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I.	  Constitutional	  Foundations	  	  
 
Nothing appears more surprising to those who consider affairs with a philosophical eye, 
than the ease with which the many are governed by the few. 
                                                 David Hume  
 
 
Evolution of British Political Thought (1066-1689) 
 
Despite being specifically rebuked in America's Declaration of Independence, King 
George III's power during the American Revolution had been vastly reduced from the Crown's 
original peak. Unlike his shared sovereignty with Parliament in the late 18th century, the King's 
power at the onset of feudal rule following the Norman invasion of 1066 was attributed solely to 
a divine right to rule from God. Seen as the natural protector of the land and its inhabitants, 
many theorists operate under the normatively described Lockean conception that the British 
Monarch's rise to power can be fashioned as a consequence of the prevailing paternalistically 
dominated family structure (ST, §78). Much like the father's assumed dominance in the sphere of 
the family, the King was seen as divinely superior to other men, thereby allowing him to exert 
his will over the masses.10  
While the King's grant of power was virtually uncontested during this period of British 
history, the introduction of English common law — through Henry II's legal reforms in 1158 — 
added a greater emphasis on judicial proceedings and criminal enforcement, correspondingly 
binding the King to carefully delineated restraints meant to protect certain moral rights of 
                                                
10 The following review of British history relies heavily on information provided by the British 
Monarchy's historical timeline, as well as the recently re-done overview of British history done 
by the BBC. These two sources are cited respectively as follows: 1) "History of the Monarch," 
The Official Website of the British Monarchy, accessed February 27, 2014, 
https://www.royal.gov.uk/HistoryoftheMonarchy/KingsandQueensoftheUnitedKingdom/TheStua
rts/CharlesI.aspx. 2) "Common Law - Henry II and the Birth of a State," BBC, accessed February 
26, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/middle_ages/henryii_law_01.shtml. 
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individuals. Albeit still a divine ruler, the advent of these laws forced the King to at least 
consider the people's rights according to a defined set of objective standards.  
As the continuing crusades brought varying degrees of instability to English society, 
tensions began to rise in the early 13th century between King John II and Britain's upper class 
barons. Whereas the previous legal reforms gave common men the ability to withstand the 
encroachments of the aristocratic landowners, the barons were beginning to feel the effects of the 
King's virtually boundless grant of power. In 1215, the barons' protests ceded to rebellion, 
placing King John and the British Crown at a great impasse. While the masses and barons both 
understood and even believed that the King had a certain right to be the ruler, they also believed 
that there were certain rights, which no King could appropriately infringe upon. As described 
first by Aquinas as the "part of the eternal law which man's nature reveals," these rights became 
enshrined in the Magna Carta, which was enacted by King John to end the baron-led rebellion.11 
Though the Magna Carta did not place significant limits on the Monarch's powers, it did create a 
basic formulation of man's rights, meant to protect the barons from the ill effects of the King's 
arbitrarily imposed laws.  
Perhaps as its most substantial effect, the Magna Carta bound British law to some 
semblance of a written constitution that defined the King's powers and guaranteed citizens rights. 
As the cornerstone of Britain's legal code, it must be understood that "in respect of the great 
weightiness and weighty greatness of the matter contained in it," the Magna Carta is "the 
fountain of all the fundamental laws" in the modern English State.12 Unlike the American 
government's reliance on the Constitution, the "unwritten" nature of Britain's pre-18th century 
                                                
11 Roscoe Pound, "Common Law and Legislation." Harvard Law Review 21, no. 6 (April 1908): 
390. 
12 Edward Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law." Harvard 
Law Review 42, no. 3 (January 1929), 378. 
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version of constitutional laws "consisted of fundamental principles of free government drawn 
from a complex maze of parliamentary statutes, common law judicial proceedings, and ancient 
political customs or conventions."13 In addition, the Magna Carta also necessitated the 
introduction of Britain's Parliament as a means to help the King attain the consent of his subjects 
before levying taxes.  
As Parliament's powers continued to expand through the Tudor era, the institution began 
to encompass more responsibilities besides merely approving taxation. In particular, by Queen 
Elizabeth's reign in the late 16th century, Parliament had the ability to pass laws (with the assent 
of the Crown), rule in judicial proceedings, and serve as the link between the people of England 
and the Monarchy. By this time, many had begun to understand Parliament's influence as the 
beginning of a major power shift in England's traditionally monarch-centered philosophy. As 
described by Sir Thomas Smith during Elizabeth's reign,  
The most high and absolute power of the realme of Englande, consisteth in the 
Parliament…That which is doone by this consent is called firme, stable, and sanctum, and 
is taken for lawe. The Parliament abrogateth olde lawes, maketh newe…and hath the 
power of the whole realme, both the head and the body. For everie English-man is 
entended to bee there present, either in person or by procuration and attornies.14 
 
Despite the nation's growing financial problems that strapped the crown following 
Elizabeth's death in 1603, her successor, James I, attempted to re-establish monarchial 
supremacy by restoring Parliament to its original taxation-based responsibilities. Though his 
actions were legal because of the King's ultimate authority in any matter, certain members of 
Parliament began arguing that even though the King held absolute power, he was still subject to 
                                                
13 George Wescott Carey and James McClellan, "Editor's Introduction" in The Federalist, The 
Gideon Edition (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), xvii. 
14 Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum (Alston ed. i906) bk. ii. See Corwin's "Higher Law" 
supra 7. 
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the "supremacy of common law."15 Amongst these activists, Edward Coke led the charge to curb 
the King's powers, operating under the belief that the "King hath no prerogative but the law of 
the land."16 Under this description, Coke attested that since the British common law "Corrects, 
Allows, and Disallows, both Statute Law, and Custom," the King was bound to the basic 
precepts of this law, just like everyone else (Coke, 374). 
In his articulation of the King's subservience to the prevailing common law, Coke 
appealed to the Law of Nature, which was given to man by God, and was considered the "moral 
law, “which governed before the law was written." Using this view of Natural Law, Coke cited 
four premises that established the supremacy of these fundamental laws over British laws 
established by both the King and Parliament (Coke, 369): 
1. That ligeance or obedience of the subject to the Sovereign is due by the law of 
nature.17  
2. That this law of nature is part of the laws of England.  
3. That the law of nature was be-fore any judicial or municipal law in the world.  
4. That the law of nature is immutable, and cannot be changed.  
  
 Besides critiquing the supremacy of the King's powers, Coke also sought to implore 
politicians to realize that like the King, Parliament's actions were also subject to this overarching 
moral law. To this end, in the famous 1610 ruling in Dr. Bonham's Case, Coke ruled "the 
common law will controul acts of parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void" 
(Coke, 368). By deeming acts of Parliament subject to "common right and reason," Coke's view 
                                                
15 Douglass North and Barry Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of 
Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of 
Economic History, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 814. 
16 The following review of Edward Coke's writings relies heavily on the portrait of Coke in: 
Edward Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law." Harvard Law 
Review 42, no. 3 (January 1929): 365-409. Hereafter, all of Coke's quotes that can be attributed 
to Corwin's review will be cited in text as Coke. 
17 Refers to the divine right to rule as well as the alternate modern view that appeals to the 
tenants of social contract theory. 
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simultaneously placed limits on the nature and content of the laws passed by the British 
government.18  
While Coke's view was preceded by the 14th century view that a governing body, even 
with the King's grant of power, "could not keep them [certain statutes] in case those statutes were 
contrary to the laws and customs of the realm, which they were sworn to keep," his arguments 
were extremely timely given the vast changes between the Tudor reign prior to 1603, and the 
Stuart tenure that followed.19 Though Elizabeth's successor, James I, still managed to maintain a 
certain semblance of stability during his reign, his 1625 death left his successor, Charles I, on the 
brink of war with Spain. From these contentious origins, Charles' dismissive view of Parliament 
only worsened his plight, eventually resulting in a Parliament-led rebellion as retribution for the 
Crown's gross abuses of power.  
Whereas Charles firmly believed that, "the liberty and freedom [of the people] consists in 
having of Government, those laws by which their life and their goods may be most their own…it 
is not for having share in Government…[for] that is nothing pertaining to them," supporters of 
Parliament advocated against notions of the King's absolute sovereignty and argued that popular 
representation was necessary for the protection of civil liberties.20 In consequence of these vastly 
differing interpretations of power, the two sides' arguments were completely incompatible, and 
climactically ended with Charles' execution in 1649. As one would assume, Charles' fall to 
Oliver Cromwell and Parliament caused a seismic ideological shift in British political thought. 
While the Monarchy had once stood as this larger than life beacon of opulence ordained by the 
                                                
18 Pound, "Common Law and Legislation," 391. 
19 Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law." 372. 
20 "History of the Monarch," The Official Website of the British Monarchy, accessed February 
27, 2014, 
https://www.royal.gov.uk/HistoryoftheMonarchy/KingsandQueensoftheUnitedKingdom/TheStua
rts/CharlesI.aspx. 
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divine power of God himself, its fall mirrored the historical magnificence of its origins, and 
suddenly allowed men to realize their ability to withstand the arbitrary will of a subjective ruler. 
Stemming from this initial cause, the refinement of this Cambrian realization eventually 
translated into massive reforms to Britain's dated governance structure.  
Though the Monarchy was reinstated after Cromwell's failed 10-year experiment of 
unitary Parliamentary rule, the two post-1660 Stuart Kings still attempted to use their Royal 
Prerogative to sidestep Parliament and rule as they pleased. As conditions continued to worsen 
throughout the 1680s, the balance between the two political bodies became increasingly strained. 
In a final attempt to re-establish the Monarch's supremacy and lessen the checks on his own 
powers, James II re-chartered England's local governments to oust his rival, Whig party. The 
King's re-chartering transformed "what had been a formidable, aggressive and highly organized 
opposition party into an impotent collection of a few individuals,"21 and resulted in only one 
Whig occupying the 104 available seats in Parliament.22  
Even with the crown's opposition virtually destroyed, James was eventually removed by 
his own supporters in 1688 because of his changing religious affiliations. Fearing that his 
newborn son would eventually become King and attempt to rule England as a Catholic State, 
Whigs and Tories came together and extended the crown to William and Mary, on the condition 
that the two would agree to sign Parliament's revised Declaration of Rights to reflect the 
ideological changes of the revolution. Though many expected war, James surprisingly abdicated 
the throne, and the Glorious Revolution symbolized a peaceful transfer of power between 
sovereigns.  
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 North and Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment," pp. 815. 
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While the Declaration of Rights was merely a compact that carried no enforceable legal 
authority, William and Mary signed the Bill of Rights into law a year later, permanently enacting 
the import of the Civil War's ideological message. In particular, these new laws "limited the 
Sovereign's power, reaffirmed Parliament's claim to control taxation and legislation, and 
provided guarantees against the abuses of power which James II and the other Stuart Kings had 
committed."23 Most importantly, the primary sovereign in England became the "King in 
Parliament," which consisted of a refined role for Parliament as a direct check on the King.24 
Taken as a whole, the underlying intentions of the reforms were twofold: to strengthen 
Parliament so it could properly legislate without having to rely solely on the King's opinion, 
while also further fortifying the defenses against arbitrary encroachments on the rights of 
individuals. Following the Glorious Revolution and its far-reaching reforms, the King in 
Parliament became the absolute sovereign of England, laying the foundations for Britain's 
modern constitutional monarchy. In this system, though the Monarch still held power, the 
reforms transformed the King into "a sovereign who reigns but does not rule," implying the 
heightened position of Parliament.25  
Locke and the Rise of Civil Government 
 
In response to the ideological changes beginning with Charles' death in 1649, new 
political treatises began to surface, articulating strong notions of individual liberty, and 
vehemently arguing against arbitrary rule. Among these writers was John Locke, whose Second 
                                                
23 "History of the Monarch," The Official Website of the British Monarchy, 
https://www.royal.gov.uk/HistoryoftheMonarchy/KingsandQueensoftheUnitedKingdom/TheStua
rts/CharlesI.aspx. 
24 North and Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment,” pp. 816. 
25 Carey and McClellan, editor's introduction, xxxix. 
 The Contemporary Anti-Federalist 18 
Treatise of Government refined Coke's insistence on man's natural rights, and stressed the 
inherent link between freedom and revolution.26  
From the first pages of his Second Treatise, Locke makes his reader acutely aware that 
the work's primary purpose is to justify and "establish the throne [of]…King William," lending 
insights into Locke's personal lauding of Parliament's restraints on the British Monarchy (ST, 
Preface). In the wake of this shift in power, Locke's treatise focused its attention on man's 
relationship to a governing structure as an ultimate means to describe his own theory of politics 
and the social contract.  
Using his theological belief in God, Locke's theory begins with the basic premise that 
since God gave the world to Adam, and because it is impossible to trace a clear lineage 
stemming from Adam to a more current heir who would "have the right of inheritance," it 
becomes impossible to properly justify the legitimacy of divine rule (ST, §1). Without a clear 
organization of a divine rule that stems directly from the "workmanship of [our] one omnipotent 
and infinitely wise maker" (ST, §6), the state of nature in the absence of organized government is 
by definition a "state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal" (ST, 
§4).  
 In this state of nature void of government, Locke argued that God endowed men — 
unlike the animals who also inhabit the world — with the faculty of reason, which allowed them 
to learn and understand how to ensure and provide for their own preservation. In particular, in 
the absence of codified laws, reason allows us to understand and interpret the Law of Nature, 
which tells us, "that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, 
health, liberty or possessions" (ST, §6). Essentially as a consequence of our collective equality as 
                                                
26 Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law." 393. 
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a function of our similar origins, Locke argues that hierarchies based on trivial notions of mortal 
supremacy were incompatible with the natural liberty of man, further implying that all men were 
naturally "free from any superior power on earth" (ST, §22). 
Since the lack of governmental rule allowed men to "order their actions, and dispose of 
their possessions and persons…within the bounds of the Law of Nature," we must now turn our 
attention to the implications stemming from this law (ST, §4). As the products and therefore 
property27 of the God who created everyone and everything, each human inhabitant is 
simultaneously "bound to preserve himself…[and] when his own preservation comes not in 
competition, ought he, as much as he can, preserve the rest of mankind" (ST, §6). On the 
contrary, by "declaring by word or action…a sedate settled design upon another man's life," the 
transgressor is put "in a state of war" with the injured party (ST, §16). Since the Law of Nature 
can be understood as a direct corollary of the rational thought given to men by God as the source 
for their own right to self preservation, the violation by the transgressor can correspondingly be 
viewed as a direct contradiction to the inherent and prevailing "common-law of reason" derived 
from God (ST, §16). 
As a basis of this unnatural offense, since the transgressor sought to use the victim as a 
means to further his own apparent ends, Locke likens this instance to a condition of slavery 
because the victim's God-given right to freedom in the state of nature is impeded. From this 
position and the previously delineated view that reason allows us to do what is necessary to 
preserve our own lives, the Law of Nature grants the victim the right to seek reparations from the 
transgressor. In such a situation, since the "safety of the innocent is to be preferred" and thereby 
carries with it a more heavily weighted consideration than the safety of the guilty, the victim is 
                                                
27 This refers to Locke's argument for the right for the unlimited accumulation of private 
property, which will be properly expanded upon as the argument progresses. 
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justified in both judging the extent of the crime, and executing the law of nature with respect to 
his own judgments (ST, §17). Through this right, one can fully understand Locke's justification 
for man's two distinct powers in the state of nature: to live by the Law of Nature as a means of 
self-preservation, and to have the power to justly punish anyone who attempts to usurp this law 
by means of a criminal encroachment. 
While the simultaneous right of the victimized individual to judge and to execute can be 
understood as necessary components of justice in the state of nature, this dual right also serves as 
one of the most prominent causes of instability. By giving a single man this twofold task, the 
punishment is inevitably subject to the individual's personal bias. Since it is clear that the 
passionate biases associated with any situation have the tendency to outweigh objective 
impartiality in judging, placing these rights in the hands of the same man has the potential to 
create further instability. Even with these weighty objections, without an organized government, 
this form of crime and punishment is the only practical portrayal of a system of justice that can 
both punish transgressors, and serve as a threat to hinder future encroachments. 
Another inherent problem evident in this natural state can be fashioned as a function of 
the precarious nature of the accumulation of property.28 Namely, if we all have the same right to 
natural reason, "which tells us, that men, once being born, have a right to their preservation, and 
consequently to…such…things as nature affords for their substance" (ST, § 25), in addition to 
also understanding that God gave "the world to men in common" to allow everyone "to make use 
of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience," how are we supposed to fairly decide who 
receives the "things" in nature that help us preserve our lives (ST, § 26)? Since our own equality 
                                                
28 Before I begin expanding on the following discussion regarding Locke’s argument for the 
accumulation of private property, I’d like to thank Peter Railton and his Moral and Political 
Philosophy (442) class Fall 2013 at the University of Michigan. His insights, lectures and notes 
deserve an immense amount of credit for their influence on this section. 
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as individuals translates to an equal claim to the world, the answer to this question resides in 
determining how the "freedom to acquire" can be remedied with the corresponding notion that 
consumption necessitates the exclusion of others from that which they too claim an equal right. 
Rather than invoking the impractical principle of securing universal consent before 
procuring a good from the natural world, Locke's view of property is justified through the 
normative notion that ought implies can. Since consumption is a necessary condition of survival, 
and each man is similarly "bound to preserve himself, and not quit his station willfully," the 
argument follows that we all have an equal right to do so. Thus, given that "every man has a 
property in his own person," Locke circumvents this problem by positing that through "mixing 
one's labor" (where labor is a function of each man, and therefore also a pure reflection of each 
man's ownership over himself) with the substances of nature, man has essentially "joined to it 
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property…[and] excludes the common right 
of other men" (ST, § 27). 
 Consequently, as society continued to expand and money surfaced as a viable medium of 
exchange, man became able to "fairly possess more land than he himself [could] use the product 
of" (ST, §50). Since the accumulation of goods through the exchange of money does not cause 
injury as an action in its own right (due to its purpose as a means), and because men consented to 
the "unequal possession of the earth" by tacitly agreeing to the effects of the monetary system by 
merely taking part in the exchange themselves, Locke justified an unlimited right to accumulate 
private property in the state of nature (ST, §50). Using the same logical framework that granted 
man the natural right to defend himself from the aggression of others, it follows that this 
precedent also gave man a natural right to defend his acquired property.  
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Given the inherent implications drawn from the monetary system, it becomes clear that 
by inserting one's labor into a portion of the natural world, man also increases the value of the 
good. In turn, it follows that as men's accumulations began to increase in the wake of the rise of 
monetary exchange, the risk posed by the encroachment of others became simultaneously more 
worrisome. In the course of establishing that the natural right to self-ownership and the intuitive 
right to accumulate property were both evident in the state of nature, the theory lends credence to 
the manifestation of these ideals as anterior to the emergence of civil society. Thus, ultimately 
for Locke, "the reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property; and the 
end why they choose and authorize a legislative, is, that there may be laws made, and rules set, 
as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of society" (ST, §222).  
In direct contraction to the Hobbesian assertion of man's rational self-interest serving as 
the impetus behind the necessity that embodies man's mutual conformity to civil society, Locke's 
theory paints man's nature in a much kinder light. Rather than viewing the majority as being 
predisposed to these wicked tendencies, Locke's argument implores us to believe instead, that the 
"corruption, and vitiousness" of the minority who disobeys reason, necessitates the separation 
from the "very unsafe, [and] very unsecure" state of nature, as a means to ensure collective 
protection (ST, §123).  
As a cost of leaving this natural state and consenting to this governmental contract, men 
were required to relinquish their natural ability "to judge, and punish the breaches of law," 
simply because "no political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to 
preserve the property, and in order to thereunto, punish the offenses of all those of that society" 
(ST, §87). In exchange for these rights from the people, Locke's view states that the government 
binds itself to preserve each of its citizens' rights to "life, liberty, and property," by providing the 
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necessary means of safety through its abilities to execute and judge the law of nature.29 Under 
this conception of the social contract, though the instituted government gains the power to 
enforce the Law of Nature within its borders as a means to pursue its ultimate charge, it is 
simultaneously "not free to do as it pleases" because it is forever bound to "the Law of Nature, 
[which] stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators, as well as all others" (ST, §135).  
Bound by this overarching law and man's equality, Locke redefined the conception of 
political power to be understood as, "…A right of making laws with penalties of death, and 
consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing 
the force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the common-
wealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good" (ST, §3). By constructing his 
definition to encompass the "public good," Locke invariably strengthened the bond between the 
individual and the governing body, representing a strong departure from the political ideas of 
King Charles I less than half a century before. Coupled with consent, and guarded by the 
overarching duty that necessitates that a government work solely for the common good, Locke's 
view allowed the connection between man and government to shift away from arbitrary rule, and 
towards a more self-reflective view. 
Since this necessary adherence to the Law of Nature implies that there exists a superior 
standard of right and wrong that is separate from the laws imposed by the government, it follows 
that a government is a fallible structure whose existence relies on the will of those who are 
subject to its laws. Considering again that all the government's actions are supposed "to be 
directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people," when the 
government usurps its contractually delineated functions by exerting "absolute power over the 
                                                
29 Harold Laski, Political Thought in England from Locke to Bentham (New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 1920), 13. 
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lives, liberties, and estates of the people," Locke counters with the insistence of the natural right 
to dissolution (ST, §131). Though this withdrawal of the public’s trust would inherently drive the 
societies' inhabitants back into the insecurities of life without government depicted in the state of 
nature, the contractual basis of Locke's civil society allows us to see that since entering the 
collective was an option, and "no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with 
an intention to be worse" (ST, §131), men are correspondingly allowed to counteract the 
sovereign's "force without authority" with their own "opposing force," contingent on the majority 
belief in the necessity behind governmental change (ST, §87).  
Essentially, Locke's primary argument debunks the view of a divine right to rule and 
challenges the nature of the relationship between a citizen and a government. Taken as a whole, 
his arguments also posed a challenge to Parliament's sovereignty because of his reliance on 
Natural Law and man's mutual equality. Though his work did not directly change the nature of 
England's government, his conception of consent spurred a tremendous following and is often 
considered as a major impetus behind many of the Revolutionary movements between the late 
18th and early 19th centuries.  
Cato's Letters and the Importance of Liberty 
 
In the same liberalized spirit as Locke, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon penned a 
series of letters between 1720-1723, refining the understanding of liberty in a political context as 
a condemnation of the British government's role in the South Sea Bubble Crisis. Under the 
pseudonym Cato in reference the Roman statesman who opted to kill himself instead of 
submitting to an unfree life in Caesar's Republic, Trenchard and Gordon's letters were published 
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in more than 80% of colonial newspapers,30 and are consistently cited as one of the most 
influential political treatises of the 18th century.31 Like the conclusions drawn from Locke's 
Second Treatise, Cato argued that the "sole end of men's entering into political societies, was 
mutual protection and defense," deriving the just government purely as a function of man's ceded 
powers from the state of nature (CL, No. 11). By placing a high value on man's natural liberties 
and ultimately invalidating tyrannical rule on the basis that "whoever pretends to be naturally 
superior to other men, claims from nature what she never gave to any man" (CL, No. 45), Cato's 
political association can best be understood as a means meant to "protect the innocent, and 
punish the oppressors" (CL, No. 11).  
Liberty for Cato was like property for Locke, and its embodiment almost single-handedly 
constituted the difference between a just civil government and an unjust tyranny. Since 
government was "intended to protect men from the injuries of one another, and not to direct them 
in their own affairs," Cato defined liberty as the power "which every man has over his own 
actions, and his right to enjoy the fruit of his labour, art and industry, as far as by it he hurts not 
the society or any members of it" (CL, No. 62). By placing individual liberty and autonomy at 
the centerpiece of their theory on government, Trenchard and Gordon's institution was not put in 
place to "alter the natural right of men to liberty," but rather to provide "for the security and 
impartial distribution of that right" (CL, No. 60). Though this deviates from Locke's view of the 
social contract, Cato believed that since "the love of liberty is an appetite so strongly implanted 
in the nature of all living creatures," it surpassed even self-preservation as "the parent of all 
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31 Rothbard, Murray. "The Growth of Libertarian Thought in Colonial America." In Conceived in 
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virtues" because it allowed men to "enjoy the means of preserving themselves" according to their 
own passions and desires as individuals (CL, No. 62). Whereas the tyrant can be likened to a 
master over a population of slaves, a just government protects these private rights and refrains 
from "meddling with the private thoughts and actions of men" (CL, No. 62).  
As is often the case, this fairly simple understanding becomes inherently complicated by 
the notion that a government (as a mechanism) does not specifically execute the law. Unlike a 
machine that is pre-programmed to create the perfect balance between safety and liberty, a 
government's actions are executed by the men given the reins of its power, who are in turn, ruled 
by their passions, "which being boundless and insatiable, are always terrible when they are not 
controlled" (CL, No. 33). Moving along these same grounds, Cato attributes these tendencies to 
man's self-interested nature by invoking the simple truism that since "men are never satisfied 
with their present condition," they constantly seek more by believing that their "greatest 
pleasures are always to come" (CL, No. 40). By incessantly looking forward to the future instead 
of merely focusing of their own present condition, man's "highest enjoyment is of that which is 
not," thereby implying that man's own nature seems to provoke him to consistently desire more 
than life has to offer (CL, No. 40).  
While of course "men who are advanced to great stations…ought to look upon 
themselves as creatures of the public," Cato argues that this ideal goal is thwarted because men 
have successfully used "pomp, titles and wealth" as a means to "make the world think that 
[those] who possess them [are] in superior merit to those that want them" (CL, No. 45). Whereas 
a normative portrayal shows us that a just leader makes serving his country his highest personal 
pleasure, allowing him "to make mankind his mistress" and prompting him to gratify his own 
desires through his services to the common good (CL, No. 40), the descriptive, historical 
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account, shows that there are "but few instances of men trusted with great power without abusing 
it" (CL, No. 60). Given these complications, Cato's argument follows the theoretical lead of 
Locke by advocating for the existence of checks on individual power to limit the potential for 
usurpations. 
In the course of ensuring the integral preservation of liberty, Cato professed that "the 
strongest cables are made out of loose hemp and flax" (CL, No. 61), invoking the belief that "the 
people's jealousy tends to preserve liberty" by allowing the individualized interests of the masses 
to necessitate their own watchful glance on the government's actions (CL, No. 33). Since "liberty 
chastises and shortens power," the jealousies of the people against the government must be 
counteracted with a mirror power on the part of the government, requiring the magistrate to be 
jealous for his citizens, instead of being jealous of them (CL, No. 33). As such, Cato's solution is 
relatively simple: "the only secret therefore in forming a free government, is to make the 
interests of the governors and of the governed the same" (CL, No. 33).32 By viewing government 
as the ever-possible transgressor waiting in the dark to act against man's natural liberties, Cato's 
arguments effectively depict the problems associated with balancing the government's 
predisposed role of protection, while also heeding each man's right to live free from the arbitrary 
rule of another.  
The Parliamentary Fountain Power 
  
 Though Parliament did not adequately represent all of the diverse interests that 
characterized the entirety of Britain's population, its revolutionary overthrow of Charles, and its 
                                                
32 In this context, Cato is implying that the institutional government needs to harness the 
jealousies of the people charged with executing its powers, and align this cumulative jealousy 
back towards the people. This description has many corollaries with the Madisonian view from 
Federalist #51, that a just government is a “reflection of human nature” that succeeds by making 
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continued insistence on a new executive who provided more protection for man's individual 
liberties, highlights the Whig's more conservative interpretation of natural rights. Whereas 
Coke's view classified Parliament's position essentially as a legal court that had the ability to 
"make new law as well as declare the old," the sovereignty of the King in Parliament after 1688 
completely changed the justification of the British government's existence. Since the Monarch's 
divine right to rule had been invalidated with Parliament's acceptance of William and Mary, the 
new political institution was forced to re-justify its own powers and relationship with the British 
people. Though this newly articulated view also appealed to a Law of Nature that was "coeval 
with mankind and dictated by God himself, [and] is of course superior in obligation to any 
other,"33 instead of trusting the people to wield the power of the nation, Parliament was viewed 
as an extension of the people; in place to protect the masses from monarchial tyranny.34 
As noted by famed English theorist William Blackstone, though all men are granted the 
natural liberty to "act as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the Law of 
Nature," every man transfers this right to the sovereign upon agreeing to enter into a civil 
society.35 Specifically, "when he enters into society, [and] gives up a part of his natural liberty as 
the price" for "civil liberty," man simultaneously agrees to be "re-strained by human laws as is 
necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public." Operating under Hobbes' view 
of man's inherently self-interested nature, Blackstone argued that "there is and must be in all of 
them [states] a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority," which in Britain's post-
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1688 case was Parliament. Thus, Parliament's position in Blackstone's view was described as the 
institution that,  
Hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, con-firming, enlarging, 
restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and ex-pounding of laws…this being the 
place where that absolute, despotic power which must in all governments reside 
somewhere, is en-trusted by the Constitution of these kingdoms…It can, in short, do 
everything that is not naturally impossible, and there-fore some have not scrupled to call 
its power by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of Parliament. True it is, that what 
the Parliament doth no authority upon earth can undo.  
 
Since Blackstone's description implies that Parliament held complete sovereign control 
over the interpretation and execution of England's complicated constitutional legal system, it 
feasibly had the power "to positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable," simply 
because there was nothing to say it couldn't. Given Cato's previously articulated view of man's 
forward-thinking nature, this simultaneously left British subjects under the complete jurisdiction 
of Parliament, forcibly binding them to follow the subjectivity of the institution’s leaders. 
Heeding this understanding, the next chapter will shift its focus towards colonial America, to 
describe how the theoretical views of Locke and Cato inspired the colonies to revolt against the 
arbitrary nature of Britain's Parliamentary rule. In veering away from the "absolute sovereignty" 
of Parliament, "the Framers split the atom of sovereignty,"36 and granted the sole power and right 
of "forming and Establishing a plan thereof [to] the People37."  
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II.	  The	  American	  Conception	  of	  Government	  
 
Europe was created by history. America was created by philosophy. 
                              Margaret Thatcher 
 
The End of British Rule 
 
As was often the case with British imperialism, Britain's primary interest in North 
America resided in the land's rich commercial value. Heeding this end, in the course of 
establishing its thirteen colonial holdings in the New World, Britain's mercantile approach 
focused more on profitability than on the exertion of its political might. Thus, while the King 
appointed governors and drafted charters for each of his thirteen colonies, these actions were 
accompanied with the express understanding that the sheer size of the Atlantic Ocean made 
direct Parliamentary rule impossible. Though the British still maintained an active role 
facilitating the basic functions of their colonies' governments, the seeds of self-governance 
quickly spread across colonial America as each colony began to enact its own legislature to 
regulate their governor's authority. Under this system, while the British government maintained 
its control through the Crown's appointed governors, the colonial governments were able to pass 
legislative regulations so long as they did not interfere with any laws passed by Parliament.38  
 In these formative years, the colonies tended to maintain their own distinct identities, 
making the colonial body as a whole, a collection of people who were united much more by their 
diversity than their uniformity. Apart from the obvious geographical differences which created a 
clear divide between the industrial north and agrarian south, the highly localized cultural 
environment was amplified further by they sheer diversity of people immigrating to America. As 
the 18th century wore on, these localist tendencies permeated throughout the British colonies and 
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remained virtually unchallenged until the unfolding of the French and Indian War (1754-1763). 
Notwithstanding the certain hardships and tragedies that stemmed from the conflict, the French 
and Indian War was pivotal for the American colonies because their collective efforts allowed 
the intercolonial differences to cede to a common recognition of their circumstantial 
similarities.39  
Despite fighting side-by-side with the British throughout the drawn-out engagement 
against the French, colonial tempers flared when Parliament declared new taxes on the colonies 
to lessen the war's heavy debt burden on the Crown's purse. Enraged by Parliament's ability to 
arbitrarily levy these contested taxes "in all cases whatsoever,"40 colonial America rallied behind 
the banner of "taxation without representation" and sought representation in Parliament to 
properly express their collective will. The crux of the colonists' argument was grounded in the 
belief that without proper representation in Parliament, the American colonies were subject to the 
whims of a governmental body located over 2,000 miles away that had no true conception of 
American life and their respective needs.41  
As their diplomatic pleas continued to go unanswered and the taxation policies became 
increasingly more severe, the rumblings of revolution began to echo more and more throughout 
the colonies. Though diplomacy first appeared to be the most expedient means to repair their 
relationship with England, "the shot heard round the world" on April 19, 1775, in Lexington, 
Massachusetts, catapulted the colonies into an all-out military uprising. 
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After months of heated discussion, the colonial Continental Congress eventually issued 
the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776, marking the birth of a new nation, free from 
British rule. Although the Declaration's bold issuance of freedom was not fully substantiated 
until the war ended in 1783, the document itself provides a striking depiction of the notion of 
liberty that was understood in the colonies at the time of our nation's founding. As a means to 
justify their decision to sever political ties with Britain, Jefferson and the other men who signed 
the sacred document expounded a list of grievances that proved how King George III's rule 
unjustly inhibited the colonists' abilities to pursue their unalienable rights to, "life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness."42  
On the basis that British rule repressed "the opinions of mankind" that provided the 
foundation for civil society, these brave men built their claims on the more liberalized Lockean 
foundation of the "Law of Nature," which tells us "that being all equal and independent, no one 
ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions" (ST, §6). From this theoretical 
view of government which emphasizes the institution's existence as a means meant solely to help 
men protect the rights "endowed by their creator," the Declaration aptly foreshadowed the 
creation of a just government built upon the bedrock of the "consent of the governed," and 
predicated on statutes "most likely to effect [the people's] Safety and Happiness."43  
American Constitutionalism  
 
After the American colonies overthrew British imperial rule, the infant nation was no 
longer under the jurisdiction of the British legal code that had previously bound the colonists to a 
similar set of basic assumptions regarding law and order. Stemming from this cause, though the 
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state legislatures still remained independently functional, the mere issuance of the Declaration of 
Independence thrust the colonies as a collective whole into a lawless state of limbo that 
ultimately only held men accountable to "the common-law of reason" (ST, §16). Given the 
"inconveniences" posed by the mere potential for societal unrest, the question was not a matter of 
whether to install a government, but much more a function of how (ST, §127). Following the 
Declaration's view that in the course of securing each individual's right to, "life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness…governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from 
the consent of the governed,"44 our Founding Fathers accepted the requisite importance of man's 
liberties, and ultimately heeded Cato’s ideological message by creating a government that was 
"intended to protect men from the injuries of one another, and not to direct them in their own 
affairs" (CL, No. 62).  
To this end, before the Declaration was issued in July, the Continental Congress 
collectively passed a resolution that allowed each state legislature to construct its own form of 
government.45 Though the Congress did not specifically dictate a uniform political structure for 
all the individual legislatures to enact, all thirteen states predicated their constructions on the 
same widespread critiques of the British legal system.46 Whereas England's "unwritten" 
constitution can be understood through Bolingbroke's definition as "that Assemblage of Laws, 
Institutions and Customs, derived from certain fix'd Principles of Reason, directed to certain fix'd 
Objects of Publick Good, that compose the general System, according to which the Communify 
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hath agreed to be governed," the American political leaders objected to this understanding 
because its complexity allowed too much room for manipulation.47  
Instead of vesting the government's powers within a "single political unit" that held the 
"undivided [and] final"48 say in all legislative matters, American constitutionalism sought to 
reduce the government's infringements on liberties by "considering the imperfection of Humane 
Nature and the unfore seen Changes of Humane Affairs," which showed the absolute necessity 
behind "clearly defining all the Restrictions and Limitations of Government, so as to admit of no 
Prevarication" prior to its enactment.49 Through this necessity, American State legislatures 
believed that the first step "taken by a people in such a state [i.e. after the breakdown of the 
established order] for the Enjoyment or Restoration of Civil Government amongst them, is the 
formation of a fundamental Constitution as the Basis and ground work of Legislation."50 Under 
this belief, since "the rights originate with the people," by way of both Constitutional 
Conventions that created the constitutions, and the ratifying conventions that required popular 
approval before their implementation, the people of the United States embodied the government's 
true fountain of power.51 
Despite the fact that many early state constitutions described themselves as "social 
compacts" that were made by "a voluntary association of individuals," upon being ratified, these 
constitutions transformed themselves from social compacts to fundamental laws.52 In describing 
the specificity of the differentiation between laws and compacts, Justice Story argued that, 
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In compacts we ourselves determine and promise what shall be done before we are 
obliged to do it. In laws we are obliged to act without ourselves determining or promising 
anything at all. It is a rule prescribed; that is, it is laid down, promulgated, and 
established. It is prescribed by the supreme power in a state, that is, among us, by the 
people, or a majority of them in their original sovereign capacity.53 
 
In this capacity, these constitutions were "not the act of a government, but of a people 
constituting a government," through tacitly accepting the plan presented before them by the 
appointed legislatures.54 To illustrate the true import granted by such a constitution that properly 
retains "the spirit of the law" and is itself "not a mere thing, but also a fact,"55 perhaps the best 
parallel can be found in the episode between Odysseus and the Sirens, drawn from Homer's 
Odyssey56: 
As Odysseus' ship barreled closer to the island dwelling of the Sirens, whose beautiful 
voices appealed to the desires of even the most rational men, Odysseus commanded his crew to 
fill their ears with beeswax to ensure that the deceitful voices would not be able corrupt their 
collective desire to return home to Ithaca. Given the Sirens' notoriously dangerous habit of 
wrecking passing ships, the beeswax represented the only thing protecting Odysseus and his 
crew from an almost certain death. Unlike his fellow shipmates, Odysseus followed the biddings 
of the goddess Circe and ordered his men to tie him to the ship's mast without the wax in his 
ears, so that he "alone could hear the voices" of the alluring temptresses.57  
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After all the precautions were taken and the ship approached the churning waters that 
adorned the Sirens' island, Odysseus stood, "bound hand in foot in the tight ship…lashed by 
ropes to the mast," and became instantaneously bewitched as the Sirens "sent their ravishing 
voices out across the air."58 Yet even while standing before his men as their captain, pleading 
with them to disobey his previous instructions, and imploring them to redirect the ship's course, 
the crew remained unfazed and continued to sail past the island.59 In the end, since the wax 
restrained the sailors from reacting to Odysseus' digressions of passion, the ship was able 
circumvent the dangers of the Sirens and continue on towards Ithaca. 
In reflecting on this episode, the paramount feature to note is the temporal demarcation 
that separates Odysseus' two sets of contradictory orders. Though Odysseus issued a new set of 
orders after hearing the Sirens' call, his crew was collectively bound to the original precedent 
because of the wax strategically placed in their ears. If you put the hyperboles of the parallel 
aside for a moment, the scene inevitably portrays an episode where rational thought usurps the 
corrupting power of shortsighted passion. More specifically, while Odysseus' preliminary 
instructions were articulated primarily as a means to help his ship attain the sole end of their 
journey (returning home safely to Ithaca); Odysseus' orders after being bewitched by the Sirens 
were given only with respect to what he individually desired at that point in time, resulting in a 
certain end that deviated considerably from the end aim of the voyage. Using the wax, Odysseus 
was able to curb the virtually inescapable effects of passion and ensure that his crew would be 
able to follow the course to their true end.  
With this understanding in place, the underlying intention of a constitution can be likened 
to Odysseus' instructions before he became influenced by the Sirens. Like Odysseus' original 
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precedent and the wax that protected its reverence, one can deduce that a constitution's job is to 
serve as the "waxy" membrane that encapsulates our government's rationally conceived ends, 
and defends them from the voracious attacks of passion that accompany our ever-changing 
public opinion. Thus — much akin to Odysseus' faithful oarsmen — while the people we elect to 
serve in our government are tasked with the seemingly impossible job of heeding the public's 
views while simultaneously keeping our nation on a steady course, they are subservient to a 
rationally conceived road map to help them reach their end. And though the people in power 
might change, and crises may even momentarily corrupt our collective decision-making abilities, 
our Constitution perpetuates our founding ideals developed from the people's own views, and 
blocks out the passionate pitfalls that could lead to the end of our country and the destruction of 
our liberty. 
Given this description, it seems rather obvious that any government ordained by such a 
constitution, correspondingly needs to be bound to some attainable end. Though the two federal 
American Constitutions — the Articles of Confederation and our current Constitution — were 
both established with the inherent purpose to serve as the force between men that would "protect 
the innocent, and punish the oppressors," the means created to pursue this particular end differed 
drastically between the two documents (CL, No. 11). In an attempt to properly contextualize both 
Constitutions and shed light on their theoretical diversions, the rest of this chapter will examine 
the varying philosophies of the Anti-Federalists (Pro-Articles of Confederation) and Federalists 
(Pro-Federal Constitution).  
The Ideology of the Articles of Confederation  
 
In the first chapter of his book dedicated solely to describing the oft overlooked Anti-
Federalist position, Herbert Storing began by reminding his readers that although the Anti-
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Federalist's arguments did not halt the ratification of the federal Constitution in 1787, these men 
"had reasons" for their positions, "and the reasons have weight" (AF, 6). Along a similar line, 
instead of merely labeling the Anti-Federalist endorsed Articles of Confederation as an 
inefficient constitution that was too focused on preserving states' rights to effectively govern, this 
portrayal will attempt to view the Articles from its historical perspective: a constitution that 
sought to unify an extremely diverse colonial body in the midst of a tumultuous revolution, 
whose message reflected the fearful abuses of England's arbitrary insurrections against innate 
individual liberties.60  
 Heeding the Declaration's call for a government "by the people, for the people,"61 and 
veering away from the absolute sovereign rule of Britain's Parliament, the colonial leaders clung 
to the ideal that "liberty ought to be the direct end of government" (AF, 31), naturally causing 
their formulation to gravitate towards Montesquieu's position that "the government most 
comfortable to nature is that which best agrees with the humor and disposition of the people in 
whose favor it is established."62 Operating under the popular Anti-Federalist belief that "the form 
of government, which holds those entrusted with power, in the greatest responsibility to their 
constituents, [would be] the best calculated for freemen," the preeminent localist views pointed 
towards the states as the best receptacles to protect the people’s liberties (AF, 56). 
 Thus, while the colonial unity of the Revolution allowed the various colonies to work 
together to defeat their common enemy, their respective community-oriented tendencies resulted 
in the natural attachment to one's own colony instead of harboring a collective "American" 
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identity. In particular, as noted by Anti-Federalist Luther Martin, "at the separation from the 
British Empire, the people of America preferred the establishment of themselves into thirteen 
separate sovereignties instead of incorporating themselves into one" (AF, 15). Since they 
understood that it would be "a very great accident if the laws of one nation" were "able to suit 
another,"63 and they believed that the American collective's views were too diverse to be 
objectified into a coherent constitution that would provide "for the security and impartial 
distribution of the right" to liberty for all inhabitants (CL, No. 60), the Articles were designed 
such that each state retained its "sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, 
jurisdiction and right," that was guaranteed through their own previously enacted constitutions.64  
 Guided by the classical ideas of republican government, to mitigate the inconveniences 
posed by a democratic meeting of the people, American popular sovereignty was expressed 
through representatives who met together in the state legislatures. Unlike the members of 
Britain's Parliament, early American representatives were expected to "be a true picture of the 
people; possess the knowledge of their circumstances and their wants; sympathize in all their 
distresses, and be disposed to seek their true interests" (AF, 17). Taken as a whole, the Anti-
Federalists believed that a simple and local government that was close to the people's jealous 
eyes would be the best type of government to prevent the potentiality for an over-exertion of 
political power that might disrupt man's enjoyment of his own liberties.  
 Yet even with these considerations, the backdrop of the Revolutionary War served as a 
constant reminder of the necessity behind the obvious advantages of union. In addition, just like 
how the citizens of each state were in a state of nature with each other before the ratification of 
their individual Constitutions, the founding fathers followed Vattel's understanding that, "since 
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men are by nature equal, and their individual rights and obligations are the same, as coming 
equally from nature, Nations, which are composed of men and may be regarded as so many free 
persons living together in a state of nature, are by nature equal and hold from nature the same 
obligations and the same rights."65 Constrained by this dangerous reality, the Articles cautiously 
created "a firm league of friendship" for the thirteen states to collectively utilize, "for their 
common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare."66 In effect, 
while "the state governments were to protect and regulate individual liberty," the "general 
government was formed to take care of essential common interests" (AF, 33). In this 
arrangement, each state was considered equal, and the "friendship" of the confederacy served 
merely as a Constitution based on the trust and cooperation of all thirteen-component parts.67  
 Though the Anti-Federalists justified their belief in the power of trust, and in "the 
American spirit," by pointing towards the unification driven by necessity during the Revolution, 
their views were also predicated on a very passive type of governance that greatly 
underestimated the threat of foreign encroachments (AF, 28). Considering that England invaded 
American soil less than 25 years after the revised Constitution's 1787 ratification, the Anti-
Federalist view that the danger of European infringement was so slim, that "you may sleep in 
safety of them forever," seems grossly shortsighted (AF, 27). As described by Alexander 
Hamilton at the New York convention to ratify the refurbished Constitution, the Articles of 
Confederation was greatly influenced by the Revolution's wartime passions. Hamilton argued 
that,  
In the commencement of a revolution, which received its birth from the usurpations of 
tyranny, nothing was more natural than that the public mind should be influenced by an 
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extreme spirit of jealousy. To resist these encroachments and to nourish this spirit was the 
great object of all our public and private institutions. The zeal for liberty became 
predominant and excessive. In forming our Confederation this passion alone seemed to 
actuate us, and we appear to have had no other view than to secure ourselves from 
despotism. The object certainly was a valuable one, and deserved our utmost attention. 
But, sir, there is another object equally important and which our enthusiasm rendered us 
little capable of regarding; I mean a principle of strength and stability in the organization 
of our government, and vigor in its operations (AF, 71). 
 
 Despite being fashioned under the purest of pretenses, the Articles of Confederation 
ultimately failed because it called for a passive federal government in an era characterized by 
active European governments. In order to truly protect the liberties of its citizens, the 
confederation needed to be calibrated around a stronger central government that could properly 
conduct foreign affairs as a single unified body instead of a weakly connected confederacy of 
states. In addition to bolstering the protection of Americans' liberties through the utilization of a 
more appropriate means to conduct foreign affairs, a federal government that acted on the people 
could also serve as a check on the states' powers, by taking away the confederacy's mutual right 
to judge and execute decisions amongst themselves, for themselves. Though the Anti-Federalists 
clung to their rural roots and feared that a national government that acted on the people instead 
of the states would cause people to "forget [their] local habitats and attachments" and "be 
reduced to one faith and one government" (AF, 10), the Federalist argument prevailed, creating a 
"Confederate Republic" that experimented with a different means to reach the same underlying 
end the Articles of Confederation had fallen short of attaining (Fed, No. 9).  
The Federalist Critique of the Articles 
 
 Much in line with Hamilton's aforementioned diagnosis that the Articles were a reflection 
of the fears of passions stemming from the Revolutionary War, historian Merrill Jensen noted 
that the pre-1787 government embodied the "governmental form of the Declaration of 
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Independence,"68 insofar as its structural construction held the preservation of American liberty 
above the underlying belief in the importance of "American union" (AF, 24). In the course of 
following this view and placing the majority of political power under the jurisdiction of the 
states, the Articles' federal government appeared "neither fit for war nor peace," because the 
powers of its Congress were subservient to the "uncontrollable sovereignty [autonomy] in each 
state."69  
 Though this Constitution was designed with the understanding that intra-state unity was a 
necessity to accomplish certain mutual goals, the corresponding fear of a strong national 
government led to the creation of a congress that did not have the power to do what was 
necessary to ultimately live up to its greatest charge. As noted by George Washington before the 
1787 Constitutional Convention, "unless adequate Powers are given to Congress for the general 
purposes of the Federal Union, we shall soon molder [decay] into dust" because of the absolute 
absurdity in believing that "the general concern of this Country can be directed by thirteen 
heads."70  
 Heeding the most basic understanding voiced by Anti-Federalist Charles Pinckney that 
"all government is a kind of restraint," instead of operating under the view that small and 
predominantly localized governments were the most naturally conducive to the preservation of 
the American people’s liberties, the Federalists argued that the loose confederation created by the 
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Articles was defective for two reasons: 1) the lack of unity and powers afforded to the Federal 
government drastically increased the potentiality for the Confederacy to succumb to foreign 
invasions and domestic insurrections, and 2) the Articles' structure allowed for the development 
of factionalism in the states (AF, 42). In consequence, the Federalists believed that, "just as 
individuals have to give up some of their natural rights to civil government to enjoy peaceful 
enjoyment of civil rights, so states must give up some of theirs to federal government in order to 
secure peaceful enjoyment of federal liberties" (AF, 11).  
 Regarding the first charged deficiency, the Federalists purported that the federal 
government under the Articles of Confederation lacked the requisite energy to protect the nation 
from foreign invasions and domestic insurrections, simply because the framers allowed "an 
enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government," to become "stigmatized" by the 
perennial fears evoked by the constant reminders of the relationship between Britain's powerful 
central government and its "temper[ed] fondness of power," that was irrevocably "hostile to the 
principles of liberty" (Fed, No. 1). In critiquing the cautionary "friendship" established between 
the states, the Federalists claimed that the Articles were fallaciously structured because the weak 
confederacy discounted "that the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty" (Fed, 
No. 1).  
 Since the "friendly" alliance between the states created a federal system that was 
"destitute" of a means of coercion, the central government's powers were hindered because they 
weren't enforced by sanctions, which are "essential to the idea of law."71 As such, by creating a 
government that was "in fact nothing more than a treaty of amity of commerce and of alliance, 
between so many independent and Sovereign States," it was nearly impossible to have faith that 
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"a unanimous and punctual obedience of thirteen independent bodies," could be found with 
respect "to the acts of the federal Government.72" The Federalists believed that this was 
problematic because the loose unification did not have the ability to adequately provide for the 
safety of the infantile nation.  
 On this subject, John Jay noted in Federalist No. 3 that, "among the many objects to 
which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for 
their safety seems to be the first. The safety of the people doubtless has relation to a great variety 
of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords great latitude to those who wish 
to define it precisely and comprehensively." Following this view, if you recall Cato's argument 
outlined above, even though Trenchard and Gordon's argument was articulated for the end of 
protecting liberties, they still acknowledged that safety was the primary responsibility of any 
government that had the slightest chance of achieving this ideal goal.  
 Though the passive Congress of the Articles allowed the states to harbor the liberties of 
their respective inhabitants, the danger of foreign encroachment was a mutual problem for the 
American collective. Rather than bordering certain states, "the territories of Britain, Spain, and of 
the Indian nations…encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia" (Fed, No. 25), implying that 
self-defense for the "the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole" (Fed, No. 4). In order to 
stay in a situation of peace, "instead of inviting war," the Federalists believed that "union and a 
good national government" were necessary conditions to detract the watchful European eyes 
(Fed, No. 4).  
 In describing the relationship between war and peace, Hamilton reasoned that since war 
"is comprehensive of most, if not all mischiefs that do or can inflict mankind" because "it 
                                                
72 Madison, James. "Vices of the Political System of the United States." The University of 
Chicago, April 1787. http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch5s16.html. 
 The Contemporary Anti-Federalist 45 
depopulates nations; lays waste the finest countries; destroys arts and sciences, it many times 
ruins the best men, and advocates the worst, it effaces every trace of virtue, piety, compassion, 
and introduces all kinds of corruption in public affairs," it would be prudent for the American 
people to do everything in their power to avoid war at all costs (AF, 31). It was evident that the 
only solution was to revert away from passive governance in favor of an active government that 
acknowledged the importance of self-defense, and reflected this belief by granting the federal 
government the powers necessary to achieve this end. 
 In addition to inviting foreign interference, the weak central government under the 
Articles also lacked the ability to adequately legislate between the States. Though its short tenure 
was less than a decade long, the problems stemming from intra-state conflicts were symptomatic 
effects of the subservience of the weak central government to the individual states. Alluding to 
the "distractions" that riddled "the history of the petty republics of Greece and Rome" (Fed, No. 
9), the Federalists' argument for a strengthened central government was grounded on the lesson 
shown by history, which continually pointed to the truism that "neighboring nations…are natural 
enemies of each other" (Fed, No. 25). Given this belief, they argued that unless the American 
people recognized their over-insistence on passive governments based on their mutually strong 
attachment to the preservation of localized liberties, it was virtually inevitable that like Athens 
and Sparta before them, the "secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at 
the expense of their neighbors" (Fed, No. 25), would lead to the "natural death" of the union 
(Fed. No. 16).  
 Coupled with the inherent weaknesses associated with having a central government that 
lacked the authority to protect the nation, the "great and radical vice of the Articles" was that "it 
legislated for states, not individuals" (Fed, No. 16). By viewing the states "in their corporate or 
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collective capacities," instead of from the lens of the "individuals of whom they consist," 
factionalism had the ability to run virtually unchecked throughout the state governments (Fed, 
No. 16). The Federalists attributed the factionalism to the states' perceived "love of power," 
which forcibly prevented the people from serving their intended role as "the only proper objects 
of government" (Fed, No. 15). Since "experience is the only oracle of truth," the Articles' 
structure was problematic because as was shown in the Case of the United Netherlands, "a 
sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for communities, as 
contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive 
of the order and ends of civil polity" (Fed, No. 20). In direct contradiction to the Anti-Federalist 
fears that an energetic central government would inevitably yield to governmental usurpation, 
the Federalists endorsed the view that a large centralized government that legislated over the 
states as entities and over the people as a collective would be more effectual in preserving 
liberties.  
 In light of these theoretical inaccuracies in the design of the US' first Constitution, the 
state legislatures sent representatives to Philadelphia in May of 1787 for the express purpose of 
devising "further provisions as shall appear to them [the representatives from each state] 
necessary to render the Constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of the 
Union."73 
Principal Aims of the Reinvigorated Constitution  
 
 Operating under the view that "weakness and divisions at home" were the surest way to 
arouse European attention, the Federalists argued "nothing would tend more to secure us from 
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them [Europeans] than union, strength and good government within" (Fed, No. 5). To this end, 
the Constitution was predicated on the importance of harboring a semblance of national unity 
that had fallen by the wayside during the nation's first decade of existence. Rather than focusing 
on the vast differences that distinguished states like New York, Virginia, and Rhode Island, the 
revised Constitution emphasized the natural unity that connected the thirteen American states, 
implicating that union was natural for "a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the 
same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very 
similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting 
side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and 
independence" (Fed, No. 2). By stressing the close ties that invariably connected the whole of 
the American people, the Federalists used "unity" as the factor that would quell the potentiality 
for "domestic faction and insurrection" and provide the mortar for the requisite level of collective 
safety (Fed, No. 9).  
 Concerning the problem of factionalism, the Federalists believed that, "among the 
numerous advantages promised by a well constructed union," the Constitution's ability to 
legislate over both the people and the states gave the central government the newfound power to 
"break and control the violence of faction" (Fed, No. 10). By enlarging the size of the union, the 
new Constitution insured that "a majority of the whole" would not be able to attain enough 
influence over the entire nation "to act in unison with each other" (Fed, No. 10) at the expense of 
minorities. In consequence, by using a larger population to "refine and enlarge the public views," 
the Federalists’ Constitution reduced the effects of factionalism, drawing on the same concepts 
of republican government that had inspired both the state constitutions and the Articles.  
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 In the course of naturally extending "the authority of the Union to the persons of the 
citizens" (Fed, No. 15), the new Constitution was a "composite" that blended certain 
characteristics of both "national" and "federal" government (Fed, No. 39). In terms of this dual 
nature, Madison described that, 
The proposed Constitution ... is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal 
Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the 
sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal 
and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the 
extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of 
introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national (Fed, No. 39). 
 
 By endowing the Constitution with an expansive enumerated power allowing Congress to 
"make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper" for carrying out "the powers vested in the 
Constitution,"74 the framers also reinforced the nation's ability to "provide for the common 
defense of members" (Fed, No. 23). Aptly named the "necessary and proper" clause, this 
proposition was predicated under the basic logical connection, that in order to be successful, the 
United States’ government needed to have "the means" available to be "proportioned to the end" 
of protecting the nation and its inhabitants (Fed. No. 23). Though some opponents saw this 
clause as a potentially dangerous grant of power to an untested centralized force, the Federalists 
argued that since "the circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite," in order to 
ensure that the government has the means to counteract any threat, it follows that "no 
constitutional shackles can be wisely imposed on the [government's] power" (Fed, No. 23). As 
defended by Madison,  
Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no doubt that all the particular 
powers requisite as means of executing the general powers would have resulted to the 
government, by unavoidable implication. No axiom is more clearly established in law, or 
in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; whenever a 
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general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is 
included (Fed, No. 44). 
 
In contrast to the British government whose Parliament granted specific rights to the 
people to protect their natural liberties, the Federalists argued that the Constitution "is nothing 
more than a bill of rights — a declaration of the people in what manner they choose to be 
governed" (AF, 68). As a preliminary endeavor to expand the application of these theoretical 
descriptions of man's natural liberties into a theory on American government, take a moment and 
imagine the rules and laws that an engineer or architect must take into account in the course of 
designing a building. Since, 
Engineers reason that, given the force that gravity exerts on a building, if we want a 
building that will enable persons to live or work inside it, then we need to provide a 
foundation, walls, and roof of a certain strength. The physical law of gravity leads to the 
following "natural law" injunction for human action. The principles of engineering, 
though formulated by human beings, are not a product of their will. These principles must 
come to grips with the nature of human beings and the world in which human beings 
live.75  
 
To bring this example full circle, in order to fashion a good government, modern political 
theories — expressed through works like Locke's Second Treatise and Cato's Letters — tell us 
that the framers must heed these natural rights evident in man's natural state like an engineer has 
to heed the effects of gravity when constructing a building. These views follow that without 
barriers to account for the nature of the men whose existence necessitated the institution, it is 
impossible to construct a government that can correctly serve its role as a means for mankind's 
preservation and advancement. Though this implies an endorsement of some variation of popular 
sovereignty so the people can exert their will on their own government, this type of government 
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designed as "a reflection of human nature" must also account for the fallibility of men by 
formulating restraints on the powers of those in charge (Fed, No. 51). 
 Along these lines, as a function of the paradoxical relationship between protecting the 
people’s liberty while also ensuring the stability of the collective whole, the Federalists endorsed 
the doctrine of separation of powers on the basis that in addition to deriving all power from the 
people, "those entrusted with it [political power] should be kept in dependance on the people" 
(Fed, No. 37). "The only answer," the Federalists contended, consisted in "contriving the interior 
structure of government" such that the departments "by their mutual relations" would keep "each 
other in their proper places" (Fed, No. 51). The Federalists created a "partition of power among 
the several departments" (Fed, No. 51) to counteract the inevitability of tyranny that would come 
from "the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands" 
(Fed, No. 47). In this construction, they sought to use the "ambition" of one branch to 
"counteract ambition" in the other branches, thereby protecting a government created for the 
purpose of "controlling the governed," by obliging "it to control itself" (Fed, No. 51).  
 Stemming from the fact that the American Constitution was an original compact that 
placed the people (via their representatives) in control of all facets of the nation's operations, this 
separation was imperative to protect the American people's liberty, since "government is never 
abused and perverted" except from the personal ambition derived from "every man taking care of 
himself" (CL, No. 40). In the course of ensuring this division of power and providing "those who 
administer each department" with "the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives to 
resist the encroachment of others," the Founding Fathers also recognized that the legislature — 
not the executive branch — was the most dangerous to liberty because it reflected the passions of 
the masses. In consequence, the Constitution created an energetic executive, endowed with the 
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necessary ingredients of "unity," "duration," "an adequate provision for its support," and 
"competent powers," to serve as a check on the passionate pleas echoing through the diverse 
Congressional chambers (Fed, No. 70). Unlike the previously held fears against the 
centralization of political power, the Federalists argued "energy in the executive" was "a leading 
character in the definition of good government" (Fed, No. 70).  
The Great Concession  
  
 Though the Federalist philosophy implied that good representation would be the oil that 
would keep the constitutional machine running smoothly, the Anti-Federalists insisted that the 
Constitution needed to include a Bill of Rights, on the grounds that its broad grant of power 
failed to fully protect the most intrinsic principles that constituted human liberty. Despite 
recognizing that the addition of a bill of rights had the potential to weaken the government by 
constraining the institution's means of countering the unknown ends of providing for the nation's 
safety, the Federalists eventually used the bill as a concession to ensure that the Anti-Federalists 
would ratify the constitutional plan. In effect, the addition of the "declarative and restrictive 
clauses" that embodied the Bill of Rights was intended to extend "the ground of public 
confidence in the government" as an ultimate means, "to prevent misconstruction or abuse of 
[the government's] powers."76 
  From a theoretical standpoint, the Federalists' argument against the addition of the Bill of 
Rights can be understood through the differences between American constitutionalism and the 
British legal code. In particular, since the Magna Carta "was the fountain of all fundamental 
laws" in English society, its implementation represented a granting of rights by the British 
                                                
76 The Preamble to the US Bill of Rights. 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html. 
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government to reflect the edicts derived from the overarching conception of Natural Law. Along 
the same vein, Britain's 1689 Bill of Rights served a similar role, insofar as it was granted by the 
nation's "absolute sovereign" to protect the people's most basic rights against government 
encroachment.  
 Though these rights were absolutely necessary in England because of the nature of the 
British political system, the American government was instituted through a constitution where 
the people reasoned together to create the government, and where all rights that were not 
expressly ceded to the government were inherently reserved by the people. Since the Founding 
Fathers created a government "founded upon the power of the people, and executed by their 
immediate representatives," the Federalists' contended, "the people surrender nothing; and as 
they retain everything, they have no need of particular reservations" (Fed, No. 84). In sum, 
unlike the British construction of these bills as "stipulations between kings and their subjects," 
that represented "abridgments of prerogative in favor of privilege" (Fed, No. 84), the Federalists 
believed that the government ordained through the Constitution sufficiently protected the 
American people's liberties, implying that bills of rights were not applicable to the US 
Constitution because they were simply remnants of the English system. 
 In large part, it seems hard to deny that the Anti-Federalists' views reflected their fears of 
submitting to a strengthened federal government that protected the people’s liberty simply 
through "fixing and delineating the powers" to the different branches (AF, 67). The experience 
under Britain's Parliament left a sour taste in many American's mouths, and predominately 
fostered a fear of the government's powers instead of an understanding behind its necessity. 
Given man's nature, they argued that tyranny was a virtually inevitable feature of government, 
thereby necessitating "due limits on those powers" to provide complete protection of man's 
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natural liberties (AF, 67). In addition, the Anti-Federalists also argued that amongst the "infinite 
advantages" of the Bill of Rights, was its role in educating the populace about the preeminent 
principles of free government (AF, 69). Derived as a function of their localist views, the Anti-
Federalists' believed that providing the people with an education on politics would help foster 
attachment between man and government that would ensure the institution's continued existence. 
Arguing that the Bill of Rights served this exact function, the Anti-Federalist Federal Farmer 
contended, 
We do not by declarations change the nature of things, or create new truths, but give 
existence, or at least establish in the minds of the people the truths and principles which 
they might never otherwise have thought of, or soon forgot. If a nation means its systems, 
religious or political, shall have duration, it ought recognize the leading principles of 
them in the front page of every family book (AF, 70). 
   
 By accepting that the Bill of Rights would not "change the nature of things" it becomes 
clear that despite its lofty aspirations, the American Bill of Rights was still subservient to the 
ideals expressed through the Constitutional Convention. In particular, as described by Anti-
Federalist Samuel Chase, "A declaration of rights alone will be of no essential service [because] 
some of the powers will be abridged, or public liberties will be endangered" (AF, 67). Taken as a 
whole, though many Anti-Federalists believed that the Bill of Rights was a necessary additional 
check on the government's powers, its primary purpose was to increase the American people’s 
attachment to the government, to ensure that people would remain interested and thus watchfully 
jealous of the institution's actions.  
 With this understanding in place, the final chapter of this thesis will return to the present 
situation to reassess Snowden's charges against the previously articulated theoretical 
considerations that underlie the US Constitution.  
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III.	  Readdressing	  Snowden's	  Allegations 
Truth is by nature self-evident. As soon as you remove the cobwebs of ignorance that 
surround it, the truth shines clear.  
                                                Mahatma Gandhi 
 
 
 
The NSA's Defense  
 
 By virtue of its status as an intelligence agency, the NSA operates as a corollary of the 
Executive branch and is tasked with aiding the President's constitutionally prescribed mission to 
"preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States," specifically within the 
confines of foreign affairs.77 The NSA's specific creation can be attributed to President Truman, 
who created the agency in 1952 to serve as our government's designated Signals Intelligence 
(SIGNIT) agency in response to the increasingly important role of cryptology and data collection 
following the end of World War II.78 Though the NSA's surveillance activities were largely 
unchecked through its infancy, the Watergate scandal opened the door for criticism of the 
nations' intelligence programs, prompting Senator Frank Church to lead the charge for reform. 
His committee, known as the "Church Committee," worked on solutions for more than three 
years, eventually culminating in the 1978 passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA). All in all, these reforms created a rigid framework of oversight that sought to balance the 
necessity of secrecy with a parallel system that allowed for both judicial and congressional 
oversight.79 
                                                
77 U.S. Constitution, Article 2, Section 1, Clause 8. 
78 Thomas Burns, The Origins of the National Security Agency 1940-1952. Declassified Top 
Secret Memorandum. Early Postwar Period. Center for Cryptographic History - National 
Security Agency (NSA), 1990. 
79 James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-secret National Security Agency. New 
York: Anchor Books, 2002. 
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 In terms of judicial oversight, FISA created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC), which was originally composed of seven federal district court judges who were 
appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for the sole purpose of reviewing 
"applications for warrants related to national security investigations."80 The act was amended 
following the attacks of September 11th through the USA Patriot Act of 2001, which increased 
the number of judges from seven to eleven, and expanded the court's abilities to authorize 
surveillance activities. 
 Given the NSA's status as an international surveillance agency, the FISC is only 
designated to permit surveillance warrants with probable cause (in adherence to the Fourth 
Amendment) stating that a particular subject is either a "foreign power," or an "agent of a foreign 
power."81 As a function of the increasingly advanced technological methods of data collection 
and the similarly increasing margin for error, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) carefully dictates certain 
"minimization requirements" meant to limit the incidental collection of irrelevant data, including 
"wholly domestic" communications between innocent American citizens.82  
                                                
80 "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court." Federal Judicial Center, n.d. 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_fisc.html. 
81 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (h). 
82 Ibid. According to US Legal Code, the 4 minimization requirements are as follows: (1) 
specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney General, that are reasonably 
designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize the 
acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information 
concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to 
obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information; (2) procedures that require 
that nonpublicly available information, which is not foreign intelligence information, as defined 
in subsection (e)(1) of this section, shall not be disseminated in a manner that identifies any 
United States person, without such person's consent, unless such person's identity is necessary to 
understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance; (3) notwithstanding 
paragraphs (1) and (2), procedures that allow for the retention and dissemination of information 
that is evidence of a crime which has been, is being, or is about to be committed and that is to be 
retained or disseminated for law enforcement purposes; and (4) notwithstanding paragraphs (1), 
(2), and (3), with respect to any electronic surveillance approved pursuant to section 1802 (a) of 
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 On the other end of the oversight spectrum, Congress imposes its check through the 
House and Senate select committees on intelligence. Contrary to common belief, in addition to 
these specific committees, recently declassified documents from the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) carefully elucidate that the Obama administration, as well as the preceding 
Presidential administrations, firmly believed that releasing specific information about oversight 
forces should be "made available to all members of Congress" as a means to "inform the 
legislative debate."83 Besides declassifying the May 2012 letter from the Department of Justice 
to Congress, the DNI also opted to declassify three separate FISA court opinions (from October 
2011, November 2011, and September 2012, respectively) as well as multiple documents 
detailing communications between Congress and the Executive's intelligence agencies. Despite 
the inherently classified nature of the documents themselves, the federal government believed 
that when taken as a whole, this group of documents could help counter the charges brought 
forth by the Snowden leaks.84  
 The released FISC opinions illustrate a correspondence between the NSA and the FISC 
that depicts a much stronger semblance of oversight than Snowden's leaks led the public to 
believe. Though Judge Bates' October 2011 opinion found the agencies' programs to be 
                                                                                                                                                       
this title, procedures that require that no contents of any communication to which a United States 
person is a party shall be disclosed, disseminated, or used for any purpose or retained for longer 
than 72 hours unless a court order under section 1805 of this title is obtained or unless the 
Attorney General determines that the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily 
harm to any person. 
83 Kathleen Turner, and Robert Weich. "The Intelligence Community's Collection Programs 
Under Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act." Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence and the Department of Justice, May 4, 2012. 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Ltr%20to%20HPSCI%20Chairman%20Rogers%20and%20
Ranking%20Member%20Ruppersberger_Scan.pdf. 
84 James Clapper, "DNI James Clapper's Cover Letter Announcing the Document Release," 
August 21, 2013. 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/DNI%20Clapper%20Section%20702%20Declassification%
20Cover%20Letter.pdf. 
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"deficient on statutory and constitutional grounds" because the minimization standards allowed 
for too much leeway in the collection of "wholly domestic communications," his second opinion 
points towards a vigorous system of oversight evidenced by the compliance and refined dialogue 
between the NSA and the FISC.85 The November ruling showed that the NSA made three 
significant revisions to its minimization standards before resubmitting their warrant, which met 
the "requirements of both 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) and the Fourth Amendment," thereby 
illustrating that the NSA had "adequately corrected the deficiencies" evident in the previous 
month's opinion.86 While this only represents a single example, it is hard to imagine that this was 
the only time that these measures were taken by the court, further implying that given the current 
regulatory framework, the oversight measures have the capacity to work successfully. 
 In reference to the two major accusations stemming from Snowden's initial leaks, 
respectively focused on the bulk collection of telephony metadata records, and the Prism 
program's controversial certification to gather electronic communications, the government has 
also taken additional lengths to demonstrate how the leaked programs adhere to both 
constitutional and codified legal precedents. The critique of the telephony collection centers on 
the notion that the US government used a broad interpretation of the Patriot Act to empower the 
NSA to require third party business entities (including phone companies like Verizon), to hand 
over mass quantities of their customer's phone records in the form of metadata. Though the 
collection of metadata does not make the government privy to the actual details of calls, but 
instead only "the transactional information that phone companies retain in their systems for a 
period of time in the ordinary course of business," represented purely as "data fields showing 
                                                
85 John Bates. "Memorandum Opinion." Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, October 3, 
2011. http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/162016974-FISA-court-
opinion-with-exemptions.pdf. 
86 Ibid. 
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which phone numbers called which numbers and the time and duration of the calls," Snowden 
supporters allege that the mere existence of these bulk programs opens the door for wide-ranging 
debates on the government's ability to infringe on its citizens' privacy rights.87 
 Unlike criminal investigations, which allow the government to use grand jury subpoenas 
to extract certain records, the sensitive information gathered in foreign intelligence investigations 
is classified, and cannot rely on the same methods of oversight. As such, the FISC is intended to 
serve in place of these subpoenas, and is tasked with ensuring the constitutionality of the NSA's 
warrants based on their relevancy to ongoing national security investigations.88 Upon further 
review, this substitution can be understood as a judicial check on the executive's power to collect 
foreign intelligence because of the Chief Justice's role in nominating the court's presiding 
officers. While it certainly does not provide the same level of objectivity as federal subpoenas, 
the FISC must be given some due credit as a means to fill a role that runs so contrary to the 
nature of intelligence investigations. 
 With regard to phone records, the FISC approved the warrants for the mass collection of 
metadata because it allowed analysts to implement "call chaining," which is "used to develop 
targets for electronic surveillance," and has become a vital counter-terrorism tool since 9/11.89 
When given access to such a large sample of data, the NSA uses call chaining as an early 
warning system to establish links between suspected foreign terrorists and their domestic 
counterparts. In addition, since metadata falls under the property rights of third party businesses, 
                                                
87 Steven Bradbury, "Understanding the NSA Programs: Bulk Acquisition of Telephone 
Metadata Under Section 215 and Foreign Targeted Collection Under Section 702." Lawfare 
Research Paper Series 1, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 18. 
88 Bob Litt, Privacy, Technology and National Security: An Overview of Intelligence Collection. 
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the issuance of expansive warrants to phone companies for access to these "business records" 
that are established through contractual obligations between customers and providers, cannot be 
viewed as encroachments on an individual's Fourth Amendment rights. Put simply, these 
exchanges can be seen as an individual contractually agreeing to release their telephony metadata 
to their service provider, who is then handed a judicially approved warrant seeking access to the 
previously procured data for national security purposes.  
 While this scene points towards the disparity in the public’s response to metadata held by 
a third party and metadata held by the government, the Supreme Court's 1995 ruling in Vernonia 
School District v. Acton legitimizes the program's actions as a function of the necessity involved 
with "balancing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests."90 Though the ruling still stands, its relevance to 
intelligence investigations has recently been questioned given the criminal nature of the case that 
established the precedent. Regardless of the interesting implications stemming from what might 
become an impending Supreme Court battle, the only portion that is relevant to this particular 
debate is the current law established through Vernonia.91  
 Whereas the telephony metadata is collected from third parties, the Prism program has 
ignited much harsher criticisms because of its direct extraction methods. Critics predominately 
cite the Fourth Amendment and specifically its protection against "unreasonable search and 
seizure" without warrants built "upon probable cause" as the primary critique against these 
programs, since individual warrants are not typically required for each suspect. Instead, the 
                                                
90 Antonin Scalia, Vernonia School District v. Acton (The Supreme Court 1995). 
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programs operate under annual, "blanket," orders from the FISC court as a means to justify 
certain types of more intrusive data collection.92  
 The legal justification for the Prism program can be found in Section 702 of FISA. 
Passed into law in 2008 as a portion of the FISA Amendment Acts (reauthorized by Congress 
again in 2012), this authorization allowed the NSA to conduct foreign electronic surveillance 
under annual certifications instead of individualized warrants. While one could reasonably 
construe these annual certifications to resemble "blanket warrants," the government has argued 
its legal basis by tracing the historical progression of FISA. From this perspective, the necessity 
of Section 702 can be understood as the legislative response to the technological advancements 
that have changed American society since FISA's initial passage in 1978. Since FISA's 
limitations needed to be revised to ensure that the nation's intelligence agencies could be 
equipped to thwart attacks from the new mediums of communication made available by the 
internet, the 2008 revisions allowed the NSA to systematically track any number of foreign 
targets that matched the FISC's codified "certification" criterion.93 As the law specifically 
dictates:  
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon the issuance of an order in accordance 
with subsection (i)(3) or a determination under subsection (c)(2), the Attorney General 
and the Director of National Intelligence may authorize jointly, for a period of up to 1 
year from the effective date of the authorization, the targeting of persons reasonably 
believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence 
information.94 
 
  Though this type of collection does not necessitate individual warrants for the program's 
targets, it does include the aforementioned "minimization" requirements to minimize the 
                                                
92 Chelsea Carter, "Report: Secret Court Order Forces Verizon to Turn over Telephone Records 
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potentiality for encroachments on the civil liberties of innocent American citizens. While 
accounts differ on the exact number of these incidental collections, the government's defense 
implies that since the programs were created in a way where the means were "proportioned to the 
end" of protecting "the care of the common defence" of the American people (Fed, No. 23), the 
minimization requirements serve the role of "balancing the [government's] intrusion on the 
individual's Fourth Amendment interests." As such, whereas Snowden's argument is grounded on 
the belief that the NSA's data collection programs are incongruent with the government's 
constitutionally ordained responsibilities not to infringe on its citizens' rights, the government's 
rebuttal allows us to understand the NSA's insistence that its programs are solely in place for the 
"promotion of legitimate governmental interests," necessary for our collective safety.95 
Applied Theoretical Defense 
 
 Though the Anti-Federalist position has faded into the periphery of modern political 
thought, the disparity between the public response to metadata held by service providers and 
metadata held by the government proves that certain features of their ideology are still very 
much alive today. In particular, this disparity seems to reflect our collective fear about what the 
government can and will do with access to our personal information. Unlike cell phone 
companies, the government has the ability to deliver sanctions against breaches of the law, 
thereby evoking a natural worry that the government can effectually use this information against 
us in legal proceedings. Given the implications of the government's powers, it comes as no 
surprise that this fear has allowed the rights guaranteed through the Bill of Rights to rise to a 
position of prominence, simply because our collective attachment has rendered them virtually 
untouchable.  
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 Whereas most laws are implemented to constrain our actions, we cling to the Bill of 
Rights because we construe its declarative statements as strict constraints on the government's 
powers. Stemming from our struggle against the tyranny of the British, it follows that these 
rights have become enshrined as the truest reminder of the freedoms guaranteed by the American 
government. While this substantiates the Anti-Federalists' claim that the Bill of Rights would 
serve the role of fostering the public's attachment to the government, it also intensifies our 
perception of their importance in the context of the American political system. Putting aside the 
momentary passions evoked by Snowden's revelations, the only way to properly assess the 
NSA's actions is to contextualize them into the theoretical foundation that underlies our nation's 
Constitution and political system.  
 As referenced above, the decision to break away from the jurisdiction of Britain's 
imperialistic rule can be traced back to objections against the "absolute sovereignty" of 
Parliament.96 Following the theoretical lead of Locke and Cato, the Declaration of Independence 
substantiated the colonial right to rebellion, setting the stage for the fulfillment of the document's 
call for the construction of a new government, founded on principles "most likely to effect [the 
people’s] safety and happiness."97 Though the nation's first collective constitution reflected the 
overarching fear of centralized power, the Articles' inability to legislate invalidated this 
shortsighted understanding. In contrast to the localist views encapsulated in the Articles of 
Confederation, the revised Constitution recognized the inherent necessity of energy in 
government, ultimately leading to a strengthened centralized force that was supplied with the 
appropriate means to fulfill its ultimate charge of providing "for the security and impartial 
distribution" of the "natural right of men to liberty" (CL, No. 60). Using Cato's definition of 
                                                
96 Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law." 406. 
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liberty as the power "which every man has over his own actions, and his right to enjoy the fruit 
of his labor, art and industry, as far as by it he hurts not the society or any members of it," the 
new Constitution sought to provide the adequate level of protection as a means to allow its 
citizens to live in safety and free from the arbitrary rule (CL, No. 62). 
 Since the Articles were predicated on a passive construction of government that over-
emphasized the protection of localized liberties at the expense of endowing the centralized force 
with the requisite power to provide for the nation's safety, the Federalists' Constitution 
recognized that the people’s rights had to be properly protected before they could actually be 
enjoyed. Thus, while the Bill of Rights grants certain rights to the people, the Supreme Court's 
ruling in Vernonia verifies that these rights are subservient to the federal government's grant of 
power, furthering implying that the government has the power to infringe on these rights in the 
"promotion of legitimate governmental interests."98 
  Heeding this precedent, though the media’s portrayal of Snowden’s leaks focused 
predominantly on the effects of the NSA’s programs, our collective ignorance of the agency’s 
necessity exacerbated our fears of the government’s intentions. Notwithstanding the immense 
impact that the Bill of Rights has had on our nation’s legislative history, since the NSA infringed 
on our privacy rights as a means to prevent another 9/11, its actions embody the Federalists’ 
insistence that energy is essential to good governance. Thus, by focusing on intent rather than 
simply the effects, my hope is that this thesis has shed light on the theoretical considerations that 
substantiate the NSA’s actions.    
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